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Abstract:
The paper contains the attempt to integration of the classical evolutionary game
theory based on replicator dynamics and the state based approach of Houston
and Mcnamara. In the new approach, individuals have different heritable strate-
gies, however the individuals carrying the same strategy can differ on the state,
role or situation in which they act. Thus, the
classical replicator dynamics is completed by the additional subsystem of
differential equations describing the dynamics of transitions between different
states. In effect the interactions described by game structure, in addition to the
demographic payoffs (constituted by births and deaths) can lead to the change
of state of the competing individuals. The special cases of the new framework of
stage structured models where the state changes describe developmental steps
or aging are derived. New approach is illustrated by the example of Owner-
Intruder game with explicit dynamics of the role changes. New model is the
generalization of the demographic version of the Hawk-Dove game, the differ-
ence is that opponents in the game are drawn from two separate subpopulations
consisting of Owners and Intruders. Intruders check random nest sites, and play
the Hawk-Dove game with the Owner if they are occupied. Interesting feedback
mechanism is produced by fluxes of individuals between subpopulations. Own-
ers produce newborns which become Intruders, since they should find a free nest
site to reproduce.
1 Introduction
The classical evolutionary game theory consists of the game structure associ-
ated by replicator dynamics (Maynard Smith 1982; Cressman 1992; Hofbauer
and Sigmund 1988, 1998) This approach is mainly based on the simple ma-
trix games, where payoff matrices describe the excess from the average growth
rate in the population for the respective strategies. To add necessary ecological
details and to describe the models in measurable parameters, the classical ap-
proach was expressed in terms of the demographic vital rates (Argasinski and
Broom 2013a, 2018a, 2018b; Zhang and Hui 2011; Huang et al. 2015, Gokhale
and Hauert 2016). In this approach instead of single payoff function there are
separate payoff functions describing the mortality (probability of death during
interaction) and fertility (offspring number resulting from the interaction), in ef-
fect vital rates (birth and death rate) are products of interaction rates describing
the distribution of interactions (game rounds) in time and demographic payoffs
describing the average outcomes of a single interaction. Those mortality and
survival payoff functions, describing the game interaction, may depend on each
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other leading to the trade-offs, such as mortality-fertility trade-off function de-
scribing the reproductive success of the survivors of the interaction (Argasinski
and Broom 2013a, 2017, 2018). The distinction between opposing mortality and
fertility forces was described as the cornerstone of the novel mechanistic formu-
lation of evolutionary theory (Doebeli et al. 2017), however, the new approach
is still based on a very strong simplifying assumption. The individuals (and thus
their payoffs) differ only by inherited strategy and the individuals carrying the
same strategy are completely equivalent. Another thing is that many conflicts in
nature have no direct effect in the reproductive success or death, however they
can affect the level of supplies of the individual. Thus births and deaths are not
the only currency in which are paid payoffs in evolutionary games. The alterna-
tive general approach to the game theoretic modelling, dealing with the problem
of non-heritable differences between individuals carrying the same genes was in-
troduced in Houston and McNamara (1999). In the state based approach the
individual differences caused by environmental conditions are explicitly taken
into consideration. Independently, basic replicator dynamics models completed
by state switching dynamics were introduced by Brunetti et al. (2015, 2018).
The goal of this paper is to integrate the state based approach with the demo-
graphic approach to the dynamic evolutionary games (Argasinski and Broom
2013a, 2017, 2018). We will derive and analyze the general framework describing
the dynamics underlying the process of state changes and the interplay between
this process and the population dynamics. Some specific models dealing with
the state or role changes already exist in literature. For example, dynamics of
pair formation problem in Battle of the sexes (Myllius 1999), dynamics of role
changes from Owner to Intruder caused by population feedbacks (Kokko et al.
2006) and formation of interacting pairs in games with time constraints (Krˇivan
et al. 2018). However, the general game theoretic framework don’t contain tools
allowing for modelling these problems. The last example (Krˇivan et al. 2018) is
described as going ”beyond replicator dynamics”, but in this paper we want to
show that replicator dynamics still can be useful for the problems of this type
and it is too early to send it on retirement.
2 Methods
We will extend the event based approach of Argasinski and Broom (2013a,2017,2018)
where individuals are involved in different activities (described as different evo-
lutionary games) and the growth rate of the population is determined by the
aggregated demographic outcomes of the particular events (rounds of different
games). Then the growth of the population of the individuals with strategy s
can be presented as
n˙s = ns
∑
j
τ j
(
W js − djs
)
(1)
where
τ j is the interaction rate of j-th event (game type)
W js is the fertility payoff (number of offspring)
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djs is the mortality payoff,
and products
∑
j τ
jW js and
∑
j τ
jdjs constitute the demographic vital rates (Ar-
gasinski and Broom 2017). The strategy s will affect payoffs in some particular
types of games or in single type of game only, described as the focal game (for
simplicity we will assume this case throughout the paper) with payoff functions
WFs and d
F
s . Then other games where all strategies will obtain equal payoffs
will constitute background mortality and fertility rates:
WB =
∑
j
τ jBW
j
B/τB average fertility per event (where τB =
∑
i
τ iB)
mB =
∑
j
τ jBd
j
B/τB average death probability per event.
Then equation (1) can be presented as
n˙s = ns
[
τF
(
WFs − dFs
)
+ τB (WB −mB)
]
. (2)
Then after adjustment of the timescale, the focal game occurrence rate can
be removed from the equation. In effect background birth and death rates will
be transformed into Φ = τBτFWB and Ψ =
τB
τF
mB leading to the simplified form
of equations (2) where superscript F is not necessary and the payoff functions
can depend on the composition of the population described by the vector of
strategy frequencies q where qs = ns/
∑
i ni:
n˙s = ns [(Ws(q)− ds(q)) + (Φ−Ψ)] . (3)
Above system of equations can be transformed to the dynamics of the relative
frequencies of the strategies by change of coordinates qs = ns/
∑
i ni leading to
the replicator dynamics:
q˙s = qs
[(
Ws(q)− W¯ (q)
)− (ds(q)− d¯(q))] , (4)
where W¯ (q) =
∑
s qsWs(q) and d¯(q) =
∑
s qsds(q). Note that background
vital rates Φ and Ψ vanishes from replicator dynamics. In more complicated
cases, where individuals differ not only on strategies but also on some another
trait such as for example sex (Argasinski 2012,2013,2017) we can use multi-
population replicator dynamics (Argasinski 2006) where initial population is
divided into some subpopulations. Then the composition of each subpopula-
tion (indexed by superscript) described by frequencies qjs = n
j
s/
∑
j n
j
s will be
described by respective replicator dynamics (4). Those system of systems (4)
will be completed by additional system describing the dynamics of relative pro-
portions between those subpopulations gs = ns/
∑
j ns (where ns =
∑
j n
j
s and
n =
∑
s ns) which will have similar form to (4) but expressed in terms of the
excess of the average subpopulation payoffs from average payoffs in the general
population. The last element that should be added is the equation on general
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population size (scaling parameter). In effect we obtain
q˙js = q
j
s
[(
W js (g, q)− W¯s(g, q)
)− (djs(g, q)− d¯s(g, q))] (5)
g˙s = gs
[(
W¯s(g, q)− W¯ (g, q)
)− (d¯s(g, q)− d¯(g, q))]
n˙ = n
[
W¯ (g, q)− d¯(g, q) + (Φ−Ψ)] .
Respective demographic payoffs can depend on each other leading to the trade-
off functions (Argasinski and Broom 2013a, 2017, 2018), for example when
reproduction occurs after mortality stage, instead of simple fertility payoff Ws
we should use mortality-fertility trade-off function where sji (g, q) = 1− dji (g, q)
V ji (g, q) =
∑
l
qls
j
i (el)Wi(el), (6)
where only survivors of the game round can reproduce. The above system can
be extended to explicit density dependence by some density dependent adult
mortality or incorporation of the juvenile recruitment survival to the fertility
payoffs (Argasinski and Broom 2013a, 2018a, 2018b). This can be implemented
by multiplication of the fertility rates W js (g, q) or V
j
i (g, q) by suppression coef-
ficient (1 − n/K). Suppression can be interpreted as the juvenile recruitment
survival. For constant mortality and fertility rates this approach leads to the
Nest Site Lottery mechanism (Argasinski and Broom 2013b), where newborns
introduced to the population compete for the available nest sites. Under short-
age of nest sites they form the pool of candidates from which are drawn those
who replace dead adults in the released nest sites. It can work for other forms
of suppression than logistic growth (Rudnicki 2018). The availability of nest
sites can be used for derivation of the fully mechanistic growth model (Argasin-
ski and Rudnicki 2017, Argasinski and Rudnicki submitted). This is important
because changing juvenile survival alters the value of the reward in evolutionary
games (Argasinski and Broom 2013a, 2018a, 2018b) which may invert the strate-
gic situation leading to breakdown of the growth of some strategy (Argasinski
and Broom 2013a) or even stabilize the unstable invasion barrier (Argasinski
and Broom 2018b). The general impact of the density dependence on selection
deserves more attention (Dan´ko et al 2018).
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3 Results
nis number of individuals with strategy s and in state i
qis = n
i
s/
∑
j n
i
j frequency of individuals in state i among s-strategists
gs =
∑
i n
i
s/
∑
z
∑
l n
l
z frequency of s-strategists in the population
τ j is the interaction rate of j-th event (game type)
W is is the fertility payoff (number of offspring) of s-strategist in state i
dis is the mortality payoff of s-strategist in state i
Φi background fertility rate in state i
Ψi background mortality rate in state i
ci,zs (g, q) switching payoff (probability of transition from state i to z )
cis =
∑
k 6=i c
i,k
s = 1− ci,is probability of leaving the state i
Λz,i background switching rate
Λi background leaving rate
V is (q, g) survival-fertility trade-off function
Zi,js (q, g) survival-switching trade-off function
Xis(q, g) switching-survival trade-off function
Y is (q, g) switching-mortality trade-off function
W¯s(g, q), W¯ (g, q) average fertility payoff of s-strategists/whole population
s¯s(g, q), s¯(g, q) average survival payoff of s-strategists/whole population
c¯s(g, q), c¯(g, q) average switching payoff of s-strategists/whole population
Φ¯s(qs), Φ¯(g, q) average background fertility rate of s-strategists/whole population
Ψ¯s(qs), Ψ¯(g, q) average background mortality rate of s-strategists/whole population
Λ¯i, Λ¯ average background leaving rate of state i/whole population
HO, HI proportion of Hawks among Owners/Intruders
ΦIs =
qOs
1−qOs Φ Intruders per capita increase rate caused by Owners background fertility
Table 1 List of important symbols
Plan of the paper:
-completion of the framework presented in introduction by switching payoffs
describing state changes resulting from the game (sections 3.1-3.2).
-introduction of the trade-off functions analogous to the mortality-fertility trade-
off function (6) describing the trade-offs between demographic payoffs and switch-
ing payoffs (section 3.3).
-introduction of ratio dependent nonuniform interaction rates, when interactions
occur between individuals in different states (Males and Females or Owners with
Intruders), section 3.4.
-derivation of the generalized replicator dynamics, where selection equations
are completed by equations describing the dynamics of fluxes between different
states among carriers of different strategies (sections 3.5-3.8), including the limit
cases of separation of timescales between switching and demographic dynamics
(section 3.9).
-special cases of the obtained framework describing the stage and age structured
populations (section 4).
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-example of Owner-Intruder game describing the competition for nest sites, with
explicit dynamics of fluxes between roles of settled Owner and homeless Intruder.
3.1 Population growth with switching payoffs
Here we will extend the framework from the previous section to the state de-
pendent case. Table 1 contains list of important symbols. Therefore, assume
that individuals in the population differ in states and similarly to the previous
section are involved in the different types of events, described by demographic
outcomes (mortality and fertility). Then each type of interaction event can be
characterized by following parameters:
τ j is the interaction rate of j-th event, since it is not affected by state.
djs,i is the mortality payoff (probability of death during interaction event)
W js,i is the fertility payoff (number of offspring resulting from the interaction)
of s-strategist in state i obtained in jth type event.
However, state is not heritable, offspring may have different state than parental
individual. We can assume that the state of the offspring is drawn with the
probability ζs,i(k) for k-th state. Then individual s, i will produce O
j
s,iζs,i(k)
individuals in state k (where Ojs,i is the mating payoff which describes the num-
ber of offspring obtained by s, i in the j-th type event). Then
∑
z ns,zO
j
s,zζs,z(k)
individuals in state k will be produced leading to the following average aggre-
gated per capita fertility rate of individual s, i caused by the j-th type of event:
W js,i =
∑
z ns,zO
j
s,zζs,z(i)
ns,i
(7)
and Ojs,i is the mating payoff (successful mating attempts). The general growth
equation equivalent to (1) of the subpopulation of individuals in state i and with
strategy s (described by the subscript vector s, i while superscripts will describe
event type will be:
n˙s,i = ns,i
∑
j
τ j
(
W js,i − djs,i
)
(8)
We should add the third type of the event outcome, the probability of switch
in the state from i to k (for i 6= k) described by cjs,i,k (assume that cjs,i =∑
k 6=i c
j
s,i,k = 1 − cjs,i,i describes the per capita probability of leaving the state
i). This idea is similar to the state switching dynamics introduced by Brunetti
et al. (2015, 2018). Then the population should be divided into different state
classes. Then we should update our equation to the following form where term∑
j niτ
jcjs,i describes the leaving rate, i.e. changes of a state of the individuals
in the i-th state, while term
∑
j
∑
z nzτ
jcjs,z,i describes the incoming rate, per
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capita increase of individuals in state i caused by switches of individuals at the
other states.
n˙s,i =
∑
j
ns,iτ
j
(
W js,i − djs,i
)
− ns,i
∑
j
τ jcjs,i +
∑
j
∑
z 6=i
ns,zτ
jcjs,z,i (9)
= ns,i
∑
j
τ j
(
W js,i − djs,i
)
+
∑
j
τ j
∑
z 6=i
ns,z
ns,i
cjs,z,i −
∑
j
cjs,i

3.2 Extraction of the focal type of interaction
Now we can extract focal interactions affected by analyzed trait from the general
dynamics and assume that they are functions of the population composition i.e.
game payoffs. The population state is described by vector (qs,i, gs):
qs,i = ns,i/
∑
l ns,l state distributions among carriers of the particular strategies
gs =
∑
i ns,i/
∑
z
∑
l nz,l strategy frequencies
See fig.1 for the schematic presentation of the phase space. Individuals enter an
focal game (with payoffs WFs,i(g, q) and d
F
s,i(g, q) where auxiliary index F means
”focal event”) at rate τF as in equation (8), and engage in other activities at
rates described by τ iB ; we can consider a single class of all such activities, as
we show below. Assume that background events do not depend on the strate-
gies but are affected by state, since for example energy level will have impact
on the overall performance of the organism. Each of the background events
can be characterized by outcomes which include a fertility W jB,i and mortality
djB,i (lower index B means ”background event”). We should also consider the
background switching dynamics where
cB,z,i =
∑
j
τ jBc
j
B,z,i/τB and cB,i =
∑
j
τ jBc
j
B,i,
because it will be affected by the actual state distribution determined by impact
of the focal game. We can calculate the outcomes of the average background
event for the individual in state i:
WB,i =
∑
j
τ jBW
j
B,i/τB average fertility per event (where τB =
∑
i
τ iB)
mB,i =
∑
j
τ jBd
j
B,i/τB average death probability per event.
In effect “background events” occur at intensity τB and individuals involved
in those events obtain fertility WB,i on average and die with probability mB,i.
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Then equation (8) can be presented similarly to (2) in the form:
n˙s,i = ns,iτF
(WFs,i(g, q)− dFs,i(g, q))+
∑
z 6=i
ns,z
ns,i
cFs,z,i(g, q)− cFs,i(g, q)

+ns,iτB
(WB,i −mB,i) +
∑
z 6=i
ns,z
ns,i
cB,z,i − cB,i
 . (10)
We can adjust the timescale to make the focal game’s vital rates equal to their
demographic payoffs. This will keep the mechanistic interpretation as the num-
ber of offspring and the death probability during the interaction event. It is
clear that only the ratio of our two interaction rates is important for the evolu-
tion of the population. Similarly to (3), after a change of timescale t˜ = tτF , τF
vanishes and τB transforms into θ =
τB
τF
. Since demographic parameters WB,i
and mB,i never occur without the ratio between intensities θ, we can simplify
this by substitutions Φi = θWB,i and Ψ
i = θmB,i, constituting the background
vital rates. In similar way we can derive the background switching intensities
Λz,i = θcB,z,i and respectively Λ
i = θcB,i This leads to:
n˙s,i = ns,i
(WFs,i(g, q)− dFs,i(g, q))+
∑
z 6=i
ns,z
ns,i
cFs,z,i(g, q)− cFs,i(g, q)

+ ns,i
(Φi −Ψi)+
∑
z 6=i
ns,z
ns,i
Λz,i − Λi
 . (11)
Since we extracted the focal interaction and averaged the background interac-
tions, we can simplify the notation by removing the superscript F , since it is not
necessary now. We can assume that from now subscript describes the strategy
while superscript describes the state. This leads to the following general growth
equation:
n˙is = n
i
s
(W is(g, q)− dis(g, q))+
∑
z 6=i
nzs
nis
cz,is (g, q)− cis(g, q)

+nis
(Φi −Ψi)+
∑
z 6=i
nzs
nis
Λz,i − Λi
 . (12)
3.3 Causal structure of the focal interaction
Following Argasinski and Broom (2012) we can describe the order of the different
outcomes of the focal interaction. For example only survivors of the interaction
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can reproduce. Then we have survival payoff function sis(q, g) = 1 − dis(q, g).
To derive the mortality-fertility trade-off function where reproductive success
of survivors is described by product of survival and fertility sisW
i
s (Argasinski
and Broom, 2012), outcomes of interactions with all strategies present in the
population should be averaged. Recall that the population state is described
by set of vectors [g, q] where q consists of vectors of state distributions qs for
all strategies. Monomorphic uniform population consisting of s strategists in
state i , where qis = gs = 1 and all other entries are zeros, can be described
by state vector uis = [es, e
i
s] where es is the unit vector for argument gs and
eis is the unit vector with 1 on ith place for argument q
i
s, state distribution
vectors qij 6=s for other strategies are zeros. It can be used as an argument of the
payoff functions to simplify the notation. Then for example sis(u
l
k) will describe
survival of s strategists in state i playing with kth strategy carrier in state l.
Then the mortality-fertility trade-off equivalent to (6) function will be:
V is (q, g) =
∑
k
gk
∑
l
qlks
i
s(u
l
k)W
i
s(u
l
k)
similarly when only survivors of the interaction can switch to another state we
can introduce the survival-switching trade-off function
Zi,js (q, g) =
∑
k
gk
∑
l
qlks
i
s(u
l
k)c
i,j
s (u
l
k) (13)
that will replace functions ci,js in the equations from previous sections. Then the
function cis describing the probability of leaving the state i should be replaced
by
Zis(q, g) =
∑
j 6=i
Zi,js (q, g) =
∑
k
gk
∑
l
qlks
i
s(u
l
k)
∑
j 6=i
ci,js (u
l
k)
=
∑
k
gk
∑
l
qlks
i
s(u
l
k)c
i
s(u
l
k).
We can also imagine the situation that mortality acts after the state switching
(thus only those individuals will die which remained in the focal state) leading
to switching-survival trade-off function
Xis(q, g) =
∑
k
gk
∑
l
qlk
[
1− cis(ulk)
]
sis(u
l
k) = 1− Zis(q, g) (14)
that will replace functions sis and then the switching-mortality trade-off
function, equivalent to dis = (1− sis) will be
Y is (q, g) =
∑
k
gk
∑
l
qlk
[
1− cjs(ulk)
]
dis(u
l
k)
=
∑
k
gk
∑
l
qlk
[
1− cis(ulk)
]−Xis(q, g)
= Zis(q, g)−
∑
k
gk
∑
l
qlkc
i
s(u
l
k).
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Note that since dji = (1− sji ) we have
Xis + Y
i
s =
∑
k
gk
∑
l
qlk
[
1− cis(ulk)
]
,
which describes the average probability of remaining in the same state.
3.4 Frequency dependence and the interaction rates
Note that the respective payoff functions presented above describe outcomes of
the average focal interaction. The argument of those functions should be vector
of the population state describing distribution of states for all strategies qij and
the strategy frequencies gi. This will be enough for description of the frequency
dependent selection among randomly paired individuals with different strate-
gies and states. However, this is not the only case. We can imagine situation,
when interactions occur only between individuals in different particular states
(such as when owners of the habitat interact only with the intruders). In the
simplest ”gas” model of panmictic population of randomly meeting individuals
this can be realized by assumption that only interactions between those par-
ticular types have nonzero payoffs. However, we can imagine situations when
pairing is not completely random, such as mating when males search for females
or owner-intruder problem when homeless individuals investigate the nest-sites.
Then random pairing is limited to drawing opponents from opposite subgroups.
Then pure frequency dependence should be completed by the impact of the
proportion between interacting subpopulations. This is important, because if
the ratio between interacting subgroups is not 1, than individuals from different
subgroups will have different chances of interactions determined by availability
of potential opponents/partners. This will result in different average numbers
of interactions for different types (this will be shown later by Owner-Intruder
example). Therefore, we cannot limit ourselves to description of the average
outcomes of interaction only. This may lead to badly defined models, similarly
to the case of bimatrix games, which are independent of the proportion between
playing subpopulations (Argasinski 2006). Different numbers of interactions for
different types/states can be described by resulting different interaction rates
(Argasinski and Broom 2017). For example if we have asymmetric pairwise
interactions between individuals acting in two opposite roles (such as Owner-
Intruder conflict) and the distribution of states is described by qji for ith strategy
in the jth role. Then, on average, ratio of individuals in role 1 to individuals
in role 2 is
∑
s gsq
1
s/
∑
s gs(1 − q1s) and it is proportional to the ratio of per
capita interaction rates for both roles, since individuals in minority will always
find the opponent, while those in majority not, due to shortage of individuals
of the opposite type. Thus, for example, if for minority type we have τ1F = 1
then for majority type we have τ2F =
∑
i giq
1
i /
∑
i giq
2
i . Then, for example, the
respective death rates in (12), and in the resulting replicator equations, will be
D1i (g, q) = d
1
i (g, q) = 1− s1i (g, q) for role 1 (15)
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D2i (g, q) = d
2
i (g, q)
∑
i giq
1
i∑
i gi(1− q1i )
=
(
1− s2i (g, q)
) ∑
i giq
1
i∑
i gi(1− q1i )
for role 2
(16)
If the interaction rate decreases due to the shortage of the opponents of the
opposite type we have following interaction rates
τ1F =

1 for
∑
i giq
1
i∑
i gi(1− q1i )
≤ 1∑
i gi(1− q1i )∑
i giq
1
i
for
∑
i giq
1
i∑
i gi(1− q1i )
> 1
(17)
τ2F =

∑
i giq
1
i∑
i gi(1− q1i )
for
∑
i giq
1
i∑
i gi(1− q1i )
≤ 1
1 for
∑
i giq
1
i∑
i gi(1− q1i )
> 1
, (18)
and due to previous derivation based on the change of the timescale, it will act
as the multiplicative factor on the r.h.s. of (12). Similarly, difference in the
interaction rates for different states/types should be incorporated into switch-
ing payoffs constituting switching rates and the trade-off functions constituting
conditional fertility and death rates and conditional switching. In the next sec-
tions we will limit ourselves to the basic simple demographic and switching rates
and focus on the dynamics. When it is necessary, simple payoff functions will
be replaced by more detailed tradeoff functions and nontrivial interaction rates
described in this and in the previous section.
3.5 Derivation of the replicator dynamics
We will use the multipopulation approach (5) to replicator dynamics (Argasinski
2006, 2012, 2013, 2018), where population can be decomposed into subpopula-
tions described by their own replicator dynamics. Subsystems describing those
subpopulations are completed by additional set of replicator equations describ-
ing the dynamics of proportions of all subpopulations. Then we can describe the
distribution of states among s-strategists in related frequencies qis = n
i
s/
∑
j n
j
s.
In effect, fertility payoff (7) of the focal game can be presented in the new
indexing convention and in frequencies as:
W is(g, q) =
∑
z n
z
sO
z
s(g, q)ζ
z
s(i)
nis
=
∑
z q
z
sO
z
s(g, q)ζ
z
s(i)
qis
(19)
Now we can derive the replicator dynamics, in a standard way, by rescal-
ing the growth equations n˙i = niri = ni (Wi − di) (where ri is the func-
tion describing growth rate) into frequency equations (4) which have form
q˙i = qi (ri −
∑
k qkrk) = qi ([Wi −
∑
k qkWk]− [di −
∑
k qkdk]), describing the
12
Figure 1: Schematic presentation of the phase space of the system
changes of distribution of the states for the i-th strategy, completed by total
population size equation n˙ = n
∑
i qiri. Since∑
z 6=i
nzs
nis
cz,is (g, q) =
∑
z 6=i
qzs
qis
cz,is (g, q) and
∑
i
qis
∑
z 6=i
qzs
qis
cz,is (g, q) =
∑
i
∑
z 6=i
qzsc
z,i
s (g, q)
(20)
the respective bracketed term will be
qis
∑
z 6=i
qzs
qis
cz,is (g, q)−
∑
k
∑
z 6=k
qzsc
z,k
s (g, q)
 ,
similarly for Λ terms. Then we will obtain:
q˙is = q
i
s
[(
W is(g, q)− W¯s(g, q)
)− (dis(g, q)− d¯s(g, q))+ (Φi − Φ¯s(qs))
− (Ψi − Ψ¯s(qs))− (cis(g, q)− c¯s(g, q))− (Λi − Λ¯(qs))]
+
∑
z 6=i
qzsc
z,i
s (g, q)− qis
∑
k
∑
z 6=k
qzsc
z,k
s (g, q)

+
∑
z 6=i
qzsΛ
z,i − qis
∑
k
∑
z 6=k
qzsΛ
z,k
 , (21)
13
where
W¯s(g, q) =
∑
k
qksW
k
s (g, q), d¯s(g, q) =
∑
k
qksd
k
s(g, q),
Φ¯s(qs) =
∑
k
qksΦ
k, Ψ¯s(qs) =
∑
k
qksΨ
k,
c¯s(g, q) =
∑
k
qks c
k
s(g, q), and Λ¯(qs) =
∑
k
qksΛ
k.
3.6 Case of two competing strategies
In the special case where for all strategies we have only two states, the above
system reduces to the single equation. In addition it can be simplified by
application of well known form of the replicator dynamics for two strategies
q˙1 = q1(1 − q1) [r1 − r2]. In addition the terms describing the switching dy-
namics in (20) will be also simplified and for both states will have forms
∑
z 6=1
nzs
n1s
cz,1s (g, q) =
(
1− q1s
)
q1s
c2,1s (g, q)
∑
z 6=2
nzs
n2s
cz,2s (g, q) =
q1s
(1− q1s)
c1,2s (g, q),
leaving rates cis(g, q) reduce to
c1s(g, q) = c
1,2
s (g, q) and c
1
s(g, q) = c
1,2
s (g, q).
since there is only single opposite state to switch. Then the external bracketed
term describing the impact of switching dynamics will be:
q1s
(
1− q1s
)([(1− q1s)
q1s
c2,1s (g, q)− c1,2s (g, q)
]
−
[
q1s
(1− q1s)
c1,2s (g, q)− c2,1s (g, q)
])
=
(
1− q1s
) [(
1− q1s
)
c2,1s (g, q)− q1sc1,2s (g, q)
]
+ q1s
[(
1− q1s
)
c2,1s (g, q)− q1sc1,2s (g, q)
]
=
(
1− q1s
)
c2,1s (g, q)− q1sc1,2s (g, q)
Similar form will have terms describing the background switching dynamics.
Then the equation describing the transitions between two states will be:
q˙1s = q
1
s
(
1− q1s
) [(
W 1s (g, q)−W 2s (g, q)
)− (d1s(g, q)− d2s(g, q))+ (Φ1 − Φ2)− (Ψ1 −Ψ2)]
+
[(
1− q1s
)
c2,1s (g, q)− q1sc1,2s (g, q)
]
+
[(
1− q1s
)
Λ2,1(g, q)− q1sΛ1,2(g, q)
]
,
(22)
and the averaged values are not necessary.
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3.7 Selection of the strategies
Now we can describe the selection of strategies by application of the multipop-
ulation approach 5). Then the above system ((21) or (22))should be completed
by the additional set of the replicator equations describing the related frequen-
cies of the other strategies. Obviously the dynamics of state changes will not
have direct impact on the strategy frequencies (as well as on the population
size) since it will not change the number of strategy carriers. Then we have the
following system describing the selection:
g˙s = gs
[(
W¯s(g, q)− W¯ (g, q)
)− (d¯s(g, q)− d¯(g, q)) + (Φ¯s(qs)− Φ¯(g, q))− (Ψ¯s(qs)− Ψ¯(g, q))] ,
(23)
where
W¯ (g, q) =
∑
k
gkW¯k(g, q), d¯(g, q) =
∑
k
gkd¯k(g, q),
Φ¯(g, q) =
∑
k
gkΦ¯k(qk), Ψ¯(g, q) =
∑
k
gkΨ¯k(qk).
The above system should be completed by the equation on total population size:
n˙ = n
[
W¯ (g, q)− d¯(g, q) + Φ¯(g, q)− Ψ¯(g, q)] (24)
Note that for the uniform interaction rate τF for all strategies the negative mor-
tality bracketed terms
(
d¯s(g, q)− d¯(g, q)
)
and
(
d1s(g, q)− d2s(g, q)
)
reduce to the
positive bracketed terms (s¯s(g, q)− s¯(g, q)) and
(
s1s(g, q)− s2s(g, q)
)
. this will
not work for nonuniform interaction rates. The above system can be easily ex-
tended to density dependence by multiplying focal and background fertilities by
some juvenile recruitment mortality factor such as classical logistic suppression
(1− n/K).
3.8 Obtained framework
Summarizing the derivations from the previous subsections, we obtained the
following system containing switching dynamics, selection dynamics and the
population size:
q˙is = q
i
s
[(
W is(g, q)− W¯s(g, q)
)− (dis(g, q)− d¯s(g, q))+ (Φi − Φ¯s(qs))
− (Ψi − Ψ¯s(qs))− (cis(g, q)− c¯s(g, q))− (Λi − Λ¯(qs))]
+
∑
z 6=i
qzsc
z,i
s (g, q)− qis
∑
k
∑
z 6=k
qzsc
z,k
s (g, q)

+
∑
z 6=i
qzsΛ
z,i − qis
∑
k
∑
z 6=k
qzsΛ
z,k
 , (25)
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g˙s = gs
[(
W¯s(g, q)− W¯ (g, q)
)− (d¯s(g, q)− d¯(g, q)) + (Φ¯s(qs)− Φ¯(g, q))− (Ψ¯s(qs)− Ψ¯(g, q))] ,
(26)
n˙ = n
[
W¯ (g, q)− d¯(g, q) + Φ¯(g, q)− Ψ¯(g, q)] (27)
For the case of two states the switching dynamics reduces to
q˙1s = q
1
s
(
1− q1s
) [(
W 1s (g, q)−W 2s (g, q)
)− (d1s(g, q)− d2s(g, q))+ (Φ1 − Φ2)− (Ψ1 −Ψ2)]
+
[(
1− q1s
)
c2,1s (g, q)− q1sc1,2s (g, q)
]
+
[(
1− q1s
)
Λ2,1(g, q)− q1sΛ1,2(g, q)
]
,
(28)
Depending on the causal structure underlying the modelled phenomenon, payoff
functions W is , d
i
s and c
i
s can be replaced by more complex trade-off functions V
i
s ,
Zi,js , X
i
s or Y
i
s . For different interaction rates for different states/roles we can
use the functions (15,16) and (17,18). Then the focal game mortality payoffs
dis(g, q) should be replaced by general death rates
D1i (g, q) = d
1
i (g, q) = 1− s1i (g, q) for role 1 (in minority) (29)
D2i (g, q) = d
2
i (g, q)
∑
i giq
1
i∑
i gi(1− q1i )
=
(
1− s2i (g, q)
) ∑
i giq
1
i∑
i gi(1− q1i )
for role 2 (in majority),
(30)
or by respective alternative form in the opposite situation. However, we will
see in the later sections that we can successfully build a model limited to the
case when one particular role is always in minority.
3.9 Separation of the timescales between demographic and
switching dynamics
Now let us examine assumption that demographic events are separate from
switching events. Let us get back to the equation (10):
n˙s,i = ns,iτF
(WFs,i(g, q)− dFs,i(g, q))+
∑
z 6=i
ns,z
ns,i
cFs,z,i(g, q)− cFs,i(g, q)

+ns,iτB
(WB,i −mB,i) +
∑
z 6=i
ns,z
ns,i
cB,z,i − cB,i
 . (31)
Similarly to the separation of the focal game from the background events, we
can reindex the rates to distinguish between those two classes of events. Then
demographic events will occur with rate τ jdem while state changing events will
occur at rates τ ist Then demographic event will occur at the intensity τdem =
16
∑
l τ
l
dem and when it occurs then it will be j-th type event with probability
pjdem =
τ jdem∑
l τ
l
dem
. Similarly for state switching events we have τst =
∑
l τ
l
st and
pjst =
τ jst∑
l τ
l
st
. We can extract focal demographic and switching events
n˙s,i = ns,iτF
τdem (WFs,i(g, q)− dFs,i(g, q))+ τst
∑
z 6=i
ns,z
ns,i
cFs,z,i(g, q)− cFs,i(g, q)

+ns,iτB
τdem (WB,i −mB,i) + τst
∑
z 6=i
ns,z
ns,i
cB,z,i − cB,i
 . (32)
Then we can assume that τdem << τ st we can separate the timescales. In the
resulting q equations τst can be extracted from the bracket and set to 1 by
timescale adjustment, in effect τdem will be replaced by φ =
τdem
τst
. In the limit
φ→ 0 we obtain fast system describing the state changes:
q˙is =
(∑
z
qzsc
z,i
s (g, q)− qis
∑
k
∑
z
qzsc
z,k
s (g, q)
)
+
(∑
z
qzsΛ
z,i − qis
∑
k
∑
z
qzsΛ
z,k
)
−qis
[(
cis(g, q)− c¯s(g, q)
)− (Λi − Λ¯(qs))]
and the slow selection system driven by the equilibria of the above state changing
system which will have the same form as (23) completed by the equation on the
population size (24). We can imagine the opposite situation when state changes
are much slower than the demographic dynamics, as for example in the process
of the senescence (then we should limit to the mortality payoffs of the focal game
since newborns will also follow slow ageing process, thus they cannot rapidly
mature and enter the game). Then we can assume that τst << τdem and in
the similar way obtain the model where selection dynamics is the fast system
while the dynamics of state changes is slow, since fast demographic dynamics
will rapidly set the bracketed terms in the first line of equation (21) to zero.
Note that above approaches will be applicable only in the cases where equilibria
of fast systems exist.
4 Special case: Stage structured population
Now let us consider the case of the population where individuals are affected by
some irreversible process such as developmental cycle or senescence which can
be interpreted as the accumulation of damages. The phenomenon of this kind
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can be also considered as the state changing process. Then we should modify
our approach to describe the stepwise incremental process with x possible levels.
Then ci,i+1s and Λ
i,i+1 are intensities of the next step in the process caused by
focal type of interaction or by background dynamics. Then the term∑
z 6=i
nzs
nis
cz,is (g, q)− cis(g, q)
in equation (12) reduces to
ni−1s
nis
ci−1,is (g, q)− ci,i+1s (g, q)
(the term describing the background state changes will have similar form). We
assume that all newborns are in stage 0 and there are no interactions between
them, thus all of them will pass to the stage 1 with intensity Λ0,1 and in the
last stage the individuals will only die with intensity Ψx. Thus the aggregated
fertility of the strategy s will be
W˜s(g, q) =
∑
j
njsW
j
s (g, q),
and to obtain per capita value it should be divided by respective number of 0
stage individuals (similar function will be for the background fertilities Φ). We
should also describe the causal chain of the focal interaction, since only survivors
of the interactions should change the state, post mortality switching function
Zj,xi (13) should be applied and replace the function c
j,x
i (application of the
post-switching survival described by function Xji (14) will lead to immortality
with cli converging to 1). leading to the following form of (12):
n˙0s = n
0
s
[
W˜s(g, q)
n0s
− Λ0,1
]
n˙is = n
i
s
[(
ni−1s
nis
Zi−1,is (g, q)− Zi,i+1s (g, q)
)
− (1− sis(g, q))
]
+nis
(
ni−1s
nis
Λi−1,i − Λi,i+1
)
− nisΨi
n˙xs = n
x
s
[
nx−1s
nxs
(
Zi−1,is (g, q) + Λ
x−1,x
s (g, q)
)−Ψx] .
The above system can be presented as
n˙0s = W˜s(g, q)− n0sΛ0,1 (33)
n˙is = n
i−1
s Z
i−1,i
s (g, q)− nis
(
Zi,i+1s (g, q)− dis(g, q)
)
(34)
+ ni−1s Λ
i−1,i − nis
(
Λi,i+1 −Ψi) . (35)
n˙xs = n
x
s
[
nx−1s Λ
x−1,x
s (g, q)− nxsΨx
]
. (36)
18
Let us derive the replicator dynamics describing the state switching dynamics.
Note that for average switching payoffs we have that∑
i
qis
(
qi−1s
qis
Zi−1,is (g, q)− Zi,i+1s (g, q)
)
=
∑
i
qi−1s Z
i−1,i
s (g, q)−
∑
i
qisZ
i,i+1
s (g, q) = 0,
since by definition in the last state class x we have Zx,x+1s (g, q) = 0 (similarly
for Λ terms). This simplifies the bracketed terms describing switching payoffs
excess from the average value. We will derive replicator dynamics describing
the frequencies of stages from 1 to x, thus fertility payoffs in those stages are 0
by definition and then average fertility for carrier subpopulation is
W¯s(g, q) =
∑
j
qjsW
j
s (g, q) =
W˜s(g, q)
ns
.
since in this case W js (g, q) (19) describes per capita growth of newborn sub-
population. Similar situation is for background switching subsystem. Therefore
system (21) will be reduced to:
q˙is = q
i
s
[(
sis(g, q)− s¯s(g, q)
)− (Ψi −Ψs(qs))− W¯s(g, q)− Φ¯s(qs)
−Zi,i+1s (g, q)− Λi,i+1
]
+ qi−1s
[
Zi−1,is (g, q) + Λ
i−1,i] (37)
Equations describing the selection of the strategies and the population size will
be
g˙s = gs
[(
W¯s(g, q)− W¯ (g, q)
)
+ (s¯s(g, q)− s¯(g, q))
+
(
Φ¯s(qs)− Φ¯(g, q)
)− (Ψ¯s(qs)− Ψ¯(g, q))]
n˙ = n
[
W¯ (g, q) + s¯(g, q)− 1 + Φ¯(g, q)− Ψ¯(g, q)] .
Note that (37) is attracted by the surface
qis = q
i−1
s
Zi−1,is (g, q) + Λ
i−1,i
D
,
where
D =
(
sis(g, q)− s¯s(g, q)
)−(Ψi −Ψs(qs))−W¯s(g, q)−Φ¯s(qs)−Zi,i+1s (g, q)−Λi,i+1.
4.1 Limit case: classical age structured models of life his-
tory evolution
Interesting is the case when all individuals in the population (not only those
involved in the interactions) are subject of switching dynamics. Assume that the
switching probabilities are equal to c for all states and strategies and there is no
background switching dynamics Λ (with exception of the state 0 where there are
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no focal game switching payoffs, we assume Λ0,1 = 1) and background fertility
and mortality payoffs Φ and Ψ. This case will describe the phenomenological
aging or senescence. The simple discrete system presented here is insufficient
for description of the detailed game dynamics where payoff functions depend
on the population composition (q, g). However, it can be used for description
of the simpler case when payoffs of different strategies depend only on their
age or on some physiologic strategy of allocation of resources (such as tradeoff
in investment in reproduction or in somatic repair). Therefore demographic
payoffs will be functions of the value pj of some physiological trait in age class
j (W j(pjs) and s
j(pjs)). Then vector ps is the physiological life history strategy
which replaces the argument g describing strategy frequencies. This can be used
for modelling of the selection of life history strategies (Stearns 1992, Roff 2002).
Then post-mortality switching function will be simply
Zj,j+1i (p
j
s) = cs
j
i (p
j
s), (38)
therefore for c = 1 survival function s replaces switching function Z and the
system (33-36) of equations becomes:
n˙0s = n
0
sW¯s(ps, qs)− n0s (39)
n˙is = n
i−1
s s
i−1,i(pi−1s )− nis. (40)
For single strategy s this will be the continuous time equivalent of the Leslie
matrix model if the above model will reflect the actual age described by delays
between censuses of the population. If the duration of the age classes will be γ,
then the system (39,40) will be:
n˙0s(t) = n
0
s(t)W¯s(ps, qs)− n0s(t) (41)
n˙is(t) = n
i−1
s (t− γ)si−1,i(pi−1s )− nis(t), (42)
where si−1,is can be interpreted as the aggregated exponential survival between
censuses and W¯s(ps, qs) =
∑
j q
j
sW
j(pjs). Above system can be rescaled to the
dynamics describing the age structure and completed by replicator dynamics
describing the selection of the strategies and the equation for population size. In
effect in (37) Ψ, Φ¯s(qs) and Λ are not present, as we assumed above. In addition
(38) implies that Zi,i+1s is replaced by s
i
s which cancels out and s
j−1
i replaces
Zi−1,is . In effect we obtain system:
q˙is(t) = q
i−1
s (t− γ)si−1s (pi−1s )− qis(t)
[
s¯s(ps, qs) + W¯s(g)
]
(43)
g˙s = gs
[(
W¯s(ps, qs)− W¯ (g)
)
+ (s¯s(ps, qs)− s¯(g))
]
(44)
n˙ = n
[
W¯ (g) + s¯(g)− 1] , (45)
where s¯s(ps, qs) =
∑
j q
j
ss
j(pjs), W¯ (g) =
∑
s W¯s(ps, qs) and s¯(g) =
∑
s s¯s(ps, qs).
The more complex models allowing for description of frequency dependent game
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dynamics where payoffs depend on the vector of the strategy frequencies g, will
be subject of the next paper. The main problem is that in this case life cycle
of the individual cannot be discretized since the mortality between censuses is
shaped by trajectory of the population composition.
5 Example: Owner-Intruder game with explicit
role distribution and the underlying dynam-
ics.
Owner-Intruder game model was introduced by John Maynard Smith (1982) as
a simple bimatrix game model of conflict for property, where individuals may
randomly act in both roles of Owner and Intruder with equal probability. It is
still analyzed (Cressman and Krˇivan 2019) since it is one of the basic examples
of asymmetric matrix games. Model suggests that the strategy called Bourgeois,
defending the property while respecting the property of others, by playing Dove
as Intruder, should be favored by natural selection. Later works suggest that
the opposite strategy called Anti-bourgeois or Vagabond (Grafen 1987, Eschel
and Sansone 1995) can be also justified in some cases. The problem still needs
the general explanation (Sherratt and Mesterton-Gibbons 2015). The classic
model, as every bimatrix game ignores the proportion between both subgroups,
which may lead to false predictions of the models (Argasinski 2006). In addition
it ignores the dynamics of role changes. This aspect was explicitly considered
in Kokko et al. (2006) and later in Krˇivan et al. (2018). Alternatively, the
time spent in each role can be considered (Hinsch and Komdeur 2010). Our
model will be extension of the demographic formulation of Hawk-Dove game
(Argasinski and Broom 2013,2017,2018), based on similar assumptions to Kokko
et al. 2006 and Krˇivan et al. (2018, but for simplicity we will not include
the time constraints), but it will be more focused on the dynamics and the
explanation of underlying mechanisms, since the previous papers were more
focused on equilibria and the static analysis of the outcomes of the strategy
selection. Due to our focus on the dynamics and the processes we will ignore
asymmetries between roles (Leimar and Enquist 1984, Korona 1989, 1991) for
simplicity of payoff functions. So let us start the development of the new model.
We have two states, Owner of the Habitat and the Intruder. This leads to
the two subpopulations, which strategic compositions are affected by respective
mortalities and fertilities and fluxes between both roles (see Fig.2 for detailed
presentation). Only Owners can reproduce and this factor will be described
by their background fertility Φ and produced newborns will become homeless
intruders. Intruders will randomly check the nest sites at the constant inspection
rate, settle down when the nest site is free or play with the Owner. Fight for
the habitat, a round of Hawk-Dove game played by Owner and Intruder, will be
associated with the risk of death described by survival payoffs. The difference
between basic Hawk-Dove game (Argasinski and Broom 2013,2017,2018) and
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Figure 2: Structure of the model. Diagram of fluxes of indiviuals between Owner
and Intruder roles and the fluxes caused by different mortality soruces.
a new model is that in the new model opponents are randomly drawn from
separate pools (subpopulations of Owners and Intruders). This leads to different
numbers of interactions per time unit (described by different interaction rates)
for opposite roles (see Fig 3). By application of the concept of interaction rates
(Argasinski and Broom 2017), this situation can be modelled by (15,16) and
(17,18).
Behavioral patterns (actions) are Hawk (aggressive) and Dove (peaceful).
Individual strategy is defined as the pair of behavioral patterns associated to the
state. Thus, following the classic Maynard-Smith terminology (1982) we have
Pure Hawk, Pure Dove, Bourgeois (Hawk when Owner, Dove when Intruder)
and Anti-Bourgeois (opposite to Bourgeois). For each strategy the distribution
of roles is described by qOi = 1−qIi Now we should define payoffs. Action-specific
survival payoffs will be described by matrix:
H D
S =
H
D
[
s 1
1 1
]
and will be the same for both states. The switch payoffs will be
H D
CO =
H
D
[
0.5 0
1 0.5
]
for Owners
H D
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Figure 3: In Hawk-Dove game we have panmictic population with a random
pair formation, thus all indiviuals will interact at the same rate. In the Owner-
Intruder game Intruders check the nest-sites at the constant inspection rate.
Then, for example, if we have 16 nest sites inhabited by 11 Owners and sur-
rounded by 7 Intruders, as depicted on the figure, for three inspections per
capita probability of fight for Owner is 2/11, while for Intruder 2/7. There-
fore, the difference between Hawk-Dove game and Owner-Intruder game mainly
depends on different interaction rates for different roles.
CI =
H
D
[
0.5 1
0 0.5
]
for Intruders
Since only survivors can switch we should introduce the mortality-switching
trade-off functions Z (13). Thus for simplicity we should describe the model
in terms of survival sis(g, q) = 1 − dis(g, q). We should start the derivation of
functions ZO and ZI by multiplying entries of S and CO (S and CI) elementwise
(the only difference will be 0.5s for Hawk-Hawk interaction), leading to:
H D
ZO =
H
D
[
0.5s 0
1 0.5
]
for Owners
H D
ZI =
H
D
[
0.5s 1
0 0.5
]
for Intruders
Now we should derive the arguments of those payoff functions which are dis-
tributions of actions (more specifically proportion of Hawk playing strategies
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among individuals of both states:
HO =
∑
H giq
O
i∑
i giq
O
i
and HI =
∑
H giq
I
i∑
i giq
I
i
=
∑
H gi
(
1− qOi
)∑
i gi
(
1− qOi
) (46)
(and
∑
H giq
O
i (
∑
H giq
I
i )means sum over strategies playing Hawk as Owners
(Intruders)). Proportions of Owners and Intruders will be
∑
i giq
O
i and 1 −∑
i giq
O
i . Individuals in the population compete for K available nest sites (Hui
2006), then K − n∑i giqOi will be number of free nest sites in the population.
Then the Intruder will check the randomly chosen nest site and play the game
with the Owner with probability
pg =
n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
,
or stay there when it is free with probability
1− pg = K − n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
.
Then the respective action specific survival payoffs per nest site inspection will
be:
sOH = H
Is+ (1−HI) = 1−HI (1− s) , (47)
sIH = (1− pg) + pg
[
HOs+ (1−HO)]
= 1−HO (1− s) n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
, (48)
sOD = s
I
D = 1. (49)
We have that sOH and s
I
H are always smaller than s
O
D and s
I
D. Switching payoffs
per nest site inspection will be:
ZO,IH = H
I0.5s+ (1−HI)0 = HI0.5s (50)
ZO,ID = H
I + (1−HI)0.5 = 0.5(1 +HI) (51)
Z ,I,OH = (1− pg) + pg
[
HO0.5s+ (1−HO)]
= 1−HO [1− 0.5s] n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
(52)
Z ,I,OD = (1− pg) + pg0.5(1−HO) =
= 1− n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
0.5(1 +HO) =
= 1− 0.5
(∑
i
giq
O
i +
∑
H
giq
O
i
)
n
K
(53)
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and always ZO,IH ≤ ZO,ID and Z ,I,OD ≤ Z ,I,OH . In this case there are no fertility
payoffs for strategies. Only Owners reproduce at the rate Φ for all strategies
and their fertility feeds the Invaders subpopulation. However the reproduction
is not related to the focal interaction, thus it can be regarded as background
fertility Φ. Then the fertility for the strategy, describing per capita growth of
invaders will be
ΦIs =
qOs
1− qOs
Φ (54)
We also assume the background mortalities for both states ΨO < ΨI since
Owners are safer. In addition there is no background switching, since individuals
cannot leave the nest site without a reason. Above payoff functions describe
survival and switching outcomes of the average interaction which is fight for
the occupied nest site. However in this case, we will have different interaction
rates for different states, similarly to (17,18), which means that Owners will
play different number of game rounds per single time unit than Intruders (see
Fig.3). Owners play the game with Intruders checking the nest sites and the
probability that the nest site will be invaded is
n(1−∑i giqOi )
K when the number of
Intruders is not greater than K. Otherwise, K
n(1−∑i giqOi ) is the probability that
the Intruder will check single nest site, when the number of intruders exceeds
K. Therefore the ratio of interaction rates is
τOF
τ IF
=
n
(
1−∑i giqOi )
K
(55)
and it should be multiplied by Owners payoffs to obtain death and switching
rates similarly to (15,16). Therefore, we can assume that the timescale of our
model is adjusted to the constant Intruders inspection rate of the nest sites, how-
ever for simplicity we will limit ourselves to the cases when n
(
1−∑i giqOi ) < K
i.e. the number of Intruders is smaller than total number of nest sites. This
implies constant inspection rate for Intruders.
5.1 Switching dynamics
We can use (22), which is
q˙xs = q
x
s (1− qxs ) [(Φx − Φy)− (Ψx −Ψy)− (Dxs (g, q)−Dys (g, q))]
+ [(1− qxs )Zy,xs (g, q)− qxsZx,ys (g, q)] , (56)
to describe the switching dynamics for different strategies. We can use survival
payoffs (47),(48) and (49) to (15) and (16) for derivation of mortality bracket
(which will be positive in equation for fraction of Owners)
(
DIs(g, q)−DOs (g, q)
)
=
([
1− sIs(g, q)
]− [1− sOs (g, q)] n (1−∑i giqOi )K
)
,
similarly we will use switching payoffs (50), (51), (52) and (53) for derivation of
the bracketed term [(1− qxs )Zy,xs (g, q)− qxsZx,ys (g, q)]. Then, since ΦOs = 0 in
25
our case and due to (54), the bracket qxs (1− qxs ) (Φx − Φy) reduces to negative
term
(
qOs
)2
Φ. Then (56) will be
q˙Os = q
O
s
(
1− qOs
) [([
1− sIs(g, q)
]− [1− sOs (g, q)] n (1−∑i giqOi )K
)
− (ΨO −ΨI)
]
− (qOs )2 Φ
+
[(
1− qOs
)
ZI,Os (g, q)− qOs ZO,Is (g, q)
n
(
1−∑i giqOi )
K
]
,
Thus the differences between strategies in the state switching dynamics will
be described by survival and switching brackets. Note that after some rear-
rangement the above equation can be presented in the form revealing factors
responsible for growth and decline:
q˙Os =
(
1− qOs
) [
qOs
[
1− sIs(g, q)
]
+ ZI,Os (g, q)
]− qOs [ (1− qOs ) [1− sOs (g, q)]+ ZO,Is (g, q)] n (1−∑i giqOi )K
−qOs
(
1− qOs
)
(ΨO −ΨI)−
(
qOs
)2
Φ, (57)
showing that for growth is responsible action chosen as Intruder and its impact
is described by the term Inc =
(
qOs
[
1− sIs(g, q)
]
+ ZI,Os (g, q)
)
, while decline
is determined by action chosen as Owner and its impact is described by term
Dec =
((
1− qOs
) [
1− sOs (g, q)
]
+ ZO,Is (g, q)
)
. Then the switching dynamics
(57) can be denoted in the simplified form:
q˙Os =
(
1− qOs
)
Inc−qOs Dec
n
(
1−∑i giqOi )
K
−qOs
(
1− qOs
)
(ΨO −ΨI)−
(
qOs
)2
Φ.
(58)
Now we can derive the increase and decrease factors for Hawk and Dove actions:
IncH = q
O
s H
O (1− s) n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
+ 1−HO [1− 0.5s] n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
= 1 +
[
qOs (1− s)− 1 + 0.5s
]
HO
n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
IncD = 1− (1 +HO)0.5n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
DecH =
[(
1− qOs
)
(1− s) + 0.5s]HI
DecD = 0.5(1 +H
I).
Note that IncD > IncH when
(1 +HO)0.5 <
[
1− qOs (1− s)− 0.5s
]
HO
0.5 <
(
0.5− qOs
)
(1− s)HO.
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This condition is never satisfied. Similarly we have that DecD > DecH when
(1 +HI)0.5 >
[(
1− qOs
)
(1− s) + 0.5s]HI
0.5 >
(
0.5− qOs
)
(1− s)HI .
The second condition is always satisfied except the marginal case of qOs =
s = 0 and HI = 1. In effect Hawk action is most efficient for switching in
both roles. By substituting increase and decrease factors to (58) we can derive
switching dynamics for respective strategies:
Hawk strategy (IncH and DecH)
q˙OH =
(
1− qOH
)(
1 +
[
qOH (1− s)− 1 + 0.5s
]
HO
n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
)
−qOH
[(
1− qOH
)
(1− s) + 0.5s]HI n (1−∑i giqOi )
K
−qOH
(
1− qOH
)
(ΨO −ΨI)−
(
qOH
)2
Φ
Dove strategy (IncD and DecD)
q˙OD =
(
1− qOD
)(
1− (1 +HO)0.5n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
)
− qOD0.5(1 +HI)
n
(
1−∑i giqOi )
K
−qOD
(
1− qOD
)
(ΨO −ΨI)−
(
qOD
)2
Φ.
Bourgeois strategy (IncD and DecH)
q˙OB =
(
1− qOB
)(
1− (1 +HO)0.5n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
)
− qOB
[(
1− qOB
)
(1− s) + 0.5s]HI n (1−∑i giqOi )
K
−qOB
(
1− qOB
)
(ΨO −ΨI)−
(
qOB
)2
Φ.
Antibourgeois strategy (IncH and DecD)
q˙OA =
(
1− qOA
)(
1 +
[
qOA (1− s)− 1 + 0.5s
]
HO
n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
)
− qOA0.5(1 +HI)
n
(
1−∑i giqOi )
K
−qOA
(
1− qOA
)
(ΨO −ΨI)−
(
qOA
)2
Φ.
5.2 Mortality stage
Average mortality rates are:
D¯H(g, q, n) =
[
qOHH
I
(
1−
∑
i
giq
O
i
)
+
(
1− qOH
)
HO
∑
i
giq
O
i
]
n
K
(1− s)
D¯D(g, q, n) = 0
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D¯B(g, q, n) = q
O
BH
I (1− s) n
(
1−∑i giqOi )
K
D¯A(g, q, n) =
(
1− qOA
)
HO (1− s) n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
.
where D¯D is smallest and D¯H greatest, and D¯B < D¯A when
qOB∑
H giq
O
i
<
(
1− qOA
)∑
H gi
(
1− qOi
)
Average mortality rate of the whole population is:
D¯(g, q, n) = gHD¯H(g, q, n) + gDD¯D(g, q, n) + gBD¯B(g, q, n) + gAD¯A(g, q, n)
=
[(
gHq
O
H + gBq
O
B
)
HI (1− s)
(
1−
∑
i
giq
O
i
)
+
(
gH
(
1− qOH
)
+ gA
(
1− qOA
))
HO (1− s)
∑
i
giq
O
i
]
n
K
.
(59)
Detailed derivation is in Appendix 1
5.3 Selection dynamics
Now let us describe the selection dynamics
g˙s = gs
[(
Φ¯s(q
O
s )− Φ¯(g, q)
)− (D¯s(g, q, n)− D¯(g, q, n))− (Ψ¯s(qs)− Ψ¯(g, q))] ,
(60)
which can be reduced to
g˙s = gs
[
[Φ−ΨO + ΨI ]
(
qOs −
∑
i
gqOi
)
− (D¯s(g, q, n)− D¯(g, q, n))] . (61)
Detailed derivation is in Appendix 2.
The equation for population size will be:
n˙ = n
[
Φ¯(g, q)− Ψ¯(g, q)− D¯(g, q, n)]
= n
[
[Φ−ΨO + ΨI ]
∑
i
giq
O
i −ΨI − D¯(g, q, n)
]
.
Impact of the population size n on function D¯(g, q, n) is realized by multi-
plicative term
n
K
. Therefore, the average mortality (59) can be presented as
D¯(g, q, n) = D˜(g, q)
n
K
, in effect attractor population size can be calculated:
n˜ = K
[Φ−ΨO + ΨI ]
∑
i giq
O
i −ΨI
D˜(g, q)
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Therefore (61) contains two factors, first term
(
qOs −
∑
i gq
O
i
)
weighted by back-
ground payoffs bracket describes differences in role distributions of the subpop-
ulations of carriers, and the second term
(
D¯s(g, q, n)− D¯(g, q, n)
)
describes dif-
ferences in average mortalities resulting from role distributions too, but also
from individual actions determined by strategies. Thus it mixes the results of
strategies used in the focal interaction and background payoffs. In addition
level of individual interactions is determined by actual compositions of the car-
rier subpopulations and we have complex trade-offs between those levels. This
is even more complicated situation than in the case of the sex ratio evolution
(Argasinski 2012, 2013, 2018) where selection is determined by sex ratios in
carrier subpopulations (thus subpopulation compositions not individual traits)
while individual actions are responsible for the adjustment of those sex ratios
leading to the double level selection system. However, the difference between
those systems is that in the case of sex ratio evolution adjustment of the sub-
population composition is realized by demographic process (differences in the
numbers of births) while in Owner-Intruder game by switching dynamics inde-
pendent from demography. Therefore, it cannot be regarded as the multi-level
selection, even if the subpopulation composition plays important role in this
process. This is rather related to the extended phenotype concept (Dawkins
2016), since the subpopulation composition is the direct result of the behaviour
(i.e. leaving the property or not).
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5.4 Obtained system
Summarizing the above derivations we have the system
q˙OH =
(
1− qOH
)(
1 +
[
qOH (1− s)− 1 + 0.5s
]
HO
n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
)
−qOH
[(
1− qOH
)
(1− s) + 0.5s]HI n (1−∑i giqOi )
K
−qOH
(
1− qOH
)
(ΨO −ΨI)−
(
qOH
)2
Φ (62)
q˙OD =
(
1− qOD
)(
1− (1 +HO)0.5n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
)
− qOD0.5(1 +HI)
n
(
1−∑i giqOi )
K
−qOD
(
1− qOD
)
(ΨO −ΨI)−
(
qOD
)2
Φ. (63)
q˙OB =
(
1− qOB
)(
1− (1 +HO)0.5n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
)
− qOB
[(
1− qOB
)
(1− s) + 0.5s]HI n (1−∑i giqOi )
K
−qOB
(
1− qOB
)
(ΨO −ΨI)−
(
qOB
)2
Φ. (64)
q˙OA =
(
1− qOA
)(
1 +
[
qOA (1− s)− 1 + 0.5s
]
HO
n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
)
− qOA0.5(1 +HI)
n
(
1−∑i giqOi )
K
−qOA
(
1− qOA
)
(ΨO −ΨI)−
(
qOA
)2
Φ. (65)
g˙D = gD
[
[Φ−ΨO + ΨI ]
(
qOD −
∑
i
giq
O
i
)
+ D˜(g, q)
n
K
]
(66)
g˙B = gB
[
[Φ−ΨO + ΨI ]
(
qOB −
∑
i
giq
O
i
)
−
(
qOBH
I (1− s) n
(
1−∑i giqOi )
K
− D˜(g, q) n
K
)]
(67)
g˙A = gA
[
[Φ−ΨO + ΨI ]
(
qOA −
∑
i
giq
O
i
)
−
((
1− qOA
)
HO (1− s) n
∑
i giq
O
i
K
− D˜(g, q) n
K
)]
(68)
n˙ = n
[
Φ¯(g, q)− Ψ¯(g, q)− D¯(g, q)]
= n
[
[Φ−ΨO + ΨI ]
∑
i
giq
O
i −ΨI − D˜(g, q)
n
K
]
(69)
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where
D˜(g, q) =
[(
gHq
O
H + gBq
O
B
)
HI (1− s)
(
1−
∑
i
giq
O
i
)
+
(
gH
(
1− qOH
)
+ gA
(
1− qOA
))
HO (1− s)
∑
i
giq
O
i
]
HO =
∑
H giq
O
i∑
i giq
O
i
and HI =
∑
H gi
(
1− qOi
)∑
i gi
(
1− qOi
) ,
and the attracting density surface is:
n˜ = K
[Φ−ΨO + ΨI ]
∑
i giq
O
i −ΨI
D˜(g, q)
5.5 Resulting static fitness measure
From selection dynamics (61) we can derive proper static fitness function which
is
Fs(g, q) = q
O
s [Φ−ΨO + ΨI ]− D¯s(g, q, n).
Therefore selection is driven by two factors, focal interaction average mortality
D¯s(g, q, n) and the differences in background vital rates caused by different role
allocations. The second stage is described by factor qOs [Φ−ΨO + ΨI ]. Note
that role allocation affects the value of D¯s(g, q, n) too. In the expanded form
above function can be presented as
Fs(g, q) = q
O
s (Φ−ΨO + ΨI)−
(
qOs
[
1− sOs (g, q)
] n (1−∑i giqOi )
K
+
(
1− qOs
) [
1− sIs(g, q)
])
substitution of the respective action specific survival payoffs (47), (48) and
(49) for sOs (g, q) and s
I
s(g, q) leads to
FH(g, q) = q
O
H (Φ−ΨO + ΨI)−
[
qOHH
I
(
1−
∑
i
giq
O
i
)
+
(
1− qOH
)
HO
∑
i
giq
O
i
]
n
K
(1− s)
FD(g, q) = q
O
D (Φ−ΨO + ΨI)
FB(g, q) = q
O
B (Φ−ΨO + ΨI)− qOB
(
1−
∑
i
giq
O
i
)
HI
n
K
(1− s)
FA(g, q) = q
O
A (Φ−ΨO + ΨI)−
(
1− qOs
)∑
i
giq
O
i H
O n
K
(1− s)
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6 Numerical simulations
Due to complexity of the obtained model, to avoid the inflation of the paper,
we will limit ourselves to numerical simulations, leaving the detailed analysis
for the separate paper. First important thing is the choice of the biologically
relevant values of parameters. Let us focus on the background mortality and
fertility rates ΨO, ΨI and Φ. The timescale of the model is adjusted to the
constant Intruder’s per capita intensity of nest site inspection (equivalent to the
interaction rate with possible Owner) which leads to (55). Therefore, realistic
situation is when Owners background mortality ΨO is significantly smaller than
respective parameter for Intruders ΨI . Fertility rate Φ should be greater than
average mortality to avoid the extinction of the population. Inspections of the
nest sites occur in the behavioral timescale and are more frequent than births
and background deaths. This will allow Intruders to do few inspections before
death. Therefore, background vital rates should be smaller than focal game
interaction rate, leading to ΨO < ΨI < Φ < 1. In those cases new model re-
produces the predictions that are known from literature. Competition between
pure Hawk and pure Dove leads to the mixed equilibrium which depends on
the survival of the fight between Hawks. This situation is shown on Fig.4, for
very low fight survival probability s = 0, 001 and the background mortality and
fertility rates ΨO = 0.01, ΨI = 0.2 and Φ = 0.05. What is interesting, for such
harsh conditions the stable frequency of hawks is relatively high, in addition
the proportion of Owners among Hawks is close to 1, while for Doves is slightly
lower. In effect subpopulation of homeless Intruders contains majority of Doves.
Another interesting observation is that the total population size is smaller than
the number of nest sites K. Therefore, in the environment is enough nest sites
for all individuals. This means that the availability of nest sites is not the
main limiting factor here. The suppression is driven by pressure of the back-
ground mortality related to the searching for free nest site. Simulations also
show that both pure strategies are outcompeted by Bourgeois and paradoxical
Antibourgeois strategies. Both those strategies can successfully invade the pop-
ulation and be evolutionarily stable. In the population composed of competing
Bourgeois and Antibourgeois individuals, both strategies are stable and invasion
barrier is exactly 0.5. However, when we add some fraction of Hawks or Doves,
the invasion barrier will shift closer to the Antibourgeois pure state, leading
to the increase of the basin of attraction of Bourgeois. For some parameter
values it is possible another interesting situation, when Bourgeois is not stable
but exists mixed equilibrium composed of Bourgeois and small fraction of pure
Hawks. Let us focus on this situation. Assume that number of nest sites is
K = 10000. We can choose values ΨO = 0.01, ΨI = 0.2 and Φ = 0.8 and the
survival of the fight as s = 0.4. For initial state of the population we assume
that n(0) = 70 and all for all strategies role distributions are equal to 0.1 and
gene frequencies to 0.25. The trajectories of population parameters are depicted
on Fig.5. In addition, Fig.6 shows changes in the average mortalities D¯s(g, q, n)
for all strategies and frequencies of Hawks among Owners and Intruders HO
and HI , which determine those mortalities. They show the increase in mortal-
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ity associated with population growth. This is caused by increasing number of
fights related to the increase of the fraction of the occupied nest sites.
7 Discussion
In this paper we introduced the combination of the dynamic evolutionary games
with the state based approach. We presented the system of differential equations
which describes the dynamics of state changes and completes the replicator
dynamics. Our new framework can be useful in the integration of many distinct
fields of theoretical evolutionary biology into coherent synthetic theory. We
illustrated this by examples of application of the new framework to the classical
problems.
The natural processes such as aging or the developmental process can be
described in terms of state changing processes. It can be useful for formalization
of the game theoretic notions such as ”costs” and ”benefits” in terms of the
stages of a life cycle of the individual. We presented a simple attempt to this
problem which shows the complexity of the phenomenon. This example shows
that the new framework presented in this paper can be used in life history
modelling (Stearns 1992, Roff 2002) The future research on this topic should
investigate the relationships of this type of models with results related to the
classical demography.
Example of dynamic owner-intruder game shows the complexity of the pro-
cess underlying the changes of life situation determined by strategy. It clearly
shows that the assumption in the classical models (Maynard Smith 1982) that
the individual can be owner or intruder with the probability 0.5 was very strong
simplification. Owner-Intruder example emphasizes the importance of the defi-
nition of the demographic vital rates as the products of the interaction rates and
the demographic outcomes of the interaction (interpreted as the game round,
Argasinski and Broom 2018a). In this example different interaction rates for
opposite roles should be explicitly considered in the model (for example in the
average mortalities) thus this problem cannot be clearly described in terms of
abstract fitnesses expressed in units of instantaneous growth rates. The case
of stable mixed Bourgeois/Hawk state is important from the point of view of
the latest theories on the impact of density dependence on the selection mech-
anisms, which are one of important questions (Dan´ko et al 2018). Latest Nest
Site Lottery models (Argasinski and Broom 2013b, Argasinski and Rudnicki
2017, Rudnicki 2018, Argasinski and Rudnicki submitted) silently assume that
all newborns competing for free nest sites are Bourgeois. Our new model shows
that this may be not the case. Some newborns can be Hawks and can try
to attack the occupied nest sites. Presence of small but significant fraction of
Hawks may alter the selection mechanism. Note that our model describes very
specific conflict for supply which are nest sites. Conflict for other supplies such
as food will have different structure and will be driven by different mechanisms,
for example models of kleptoparasitism describe situations when ownership is
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Figure 4: Case of competing pure Hawk and Dove strategies. Plots of role
distributions qOs , strategy frequencies gs and numbers of Owners n
∑
s gsq
O
s ,
Intruders n
(
1−∑s gsqOs ) and the population size n. Last panel shows pro-
portions of Hawks among Owners and Intruders. Proportion of Owners among
Hawks is close to 1 while among doves is sligtly lower. On the other hand among
Intruders we have majority of Doves. In effect among reproducing Owners thie
proportion of Hawks is slightly greater than Hawk gene frequency. Interesting
is that the stable population sizeis lower than the number of nest sites, thus this
is not a lomiting factor in this case. Suppression is rather driven by background
mortalities.
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Figure 5: Plots of role distributions qOs , strategy frequencies gs and numbers
of Owners n
∑
s gsq
O
s , Intruders n
(
1−∑s gsqOs ) and the population size n.
Interesting is that the system converged to the mixture of Bourgeois and pure
Hawks
not respected (Broom and Ruxton 1998; Broom and Rychtar 2007,2009,2011;
Luther et al 2007; Broom et al 2009) This suggests that there is no general
explanation for ownership respect and different forms of ownership are shaped
by different selection mechanisms. Therefore we can expect different behavioral
patterns for those distinct conflicts, which means that the respect for nest site
may not imply respect for ownership of food and vice versa.
Important reason shown by new approach is the importance of the state
distribution for the determination of fitness, which is the quantity related to
the population growth rate (Metz 2008) but can be formalized in many ways
(Roff 2009). The dynamic equilibria of the state changing process, constituting
the role/state distributions, should be explicitly taken into consideration in the
fitness evaluation. The possible perturbations of the stable distribution of states
should be incorporated to the modern development of the ESS theory to increase
its consistence (Houston and McNamara 2005, McNamara 2013) . This will be
interesting contribution to theoretical studies related to the individual level,
originated by  Lomnicki (1988), and in particular related to research on animal
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Figure 6: Plots of changes in average mortality rates D¯s for all strategies and
frequencies of Hawk playing strategies among Owners and IntrudersHO andHI .
Note that mortality increases with the population growth since fights become
more frequent.
personalities (Dall et al. 2004; Wolf et al. 2007; Wolf and Weissing 2010, Wolf
and Weissing 2012; Wolf and McNamara 2012).
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Appendix 1 Derivation of mortality rates
Average mortality rates for respective strategies are
D¯H(g, q, n) = q
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D¯A(g, q, n) = q
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Obviously D¯D is smallest and D¯H greatest. We have that D¯B < D¯A when
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Average mortality rate of the whole population is:
D¯(g, q, n) = gHD¯H(g, q, n) + gDD¯D(g, q, n) + gBD¯B(g, q, n) + gAD¯A(g, q, n)
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Appendix 2 Derivation of selection dynamics
Selection is described by equation
g˙s = gs
[(
Φ¯s(q
O
s )− Φ¯(g, q)
)− (D¯s(g, q, n)− D¯(g, q, n))− (Ψ¯s(qs)− Ψ¯(g, q))] ,
(70)
where for strategy s average fertility is equal to Φ¯s(q
O
s ) = q
O
s Φ and back-
ground mortality is
Ψ¯s(qs) = q
O
s ΨO +
(
1− qOs
)
ΨI .
Then
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Then we can derive the bracketed terms:
(
Φ¯s(qs)− Φ¯(g, q)
)− (Ψ¯s(qs)− Ψ¯(g, q)) = [qOs Φ− Φ∑
i
giq
O
i
]
−
[
qOs ΨO +
(
1− qOs
)
ΨI −ΨO
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i −ΨI
(
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i
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i
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=
(
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s
)
[Φ−ΨO + ΨI ] .
Therefore, selection equation can be presented as
g˙s = gs
[
[Φ−ΨO + ΨI ]
(
qOs −
∑
i
gqOi
)
− (D¯s(g, q, n)− D¯(g, q, n))] . (71)
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